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“If you think about computing, there isn't just one way to compute, just like there's not just one 
way to move around.” (Michael Dell) 
 
Abstract 
This short paper proposes an alternative theory to Anthropic Principle. According to our 
interpretation, the Universe is not "fine-tuned" for life, but "roughly-tuned" for computation and its 
biofilness is only a phenomenon. This standpoint allows us to extend Seth Lloyd’s concept about the 
ultimate physical limits of computing to examine the computing capabilities of any imaginable 
universe. In addition, I draw up a universe classification based on it.   
 
Introduction 
According to the Weak Anthropic Principle 
(WAP), „our location in the Universe is necessarily 
privileged to the extent of being compatible with 
our existence as observers”, since an intelligent 
being without the special parameters of 
fundamental physical constants would not be 
able to come into existence. Anthropic Principle's 
strong version (SAP) states that this fine-tuning is 
not an accident. The Universe necessarily able to 
„admit the creation of observers within it at some 
stage.” [Barrow - Tipler, 1986, 1 - 2] 
There are several answers for either WAP or SAP. 
We can accept one or another form of them as a 
legitimate description of physical reality. Or, we 
can refuse them (i.e. arguing that they are based 
on coincidences). Nevertheless, we can propose 
an alternative hypothesis, i.e. that our Universe is 
not "fine-tuned" for life, but "roughly-tuned" for 
computation. 
Let's clarify our topic at this point.  
The following is not about the existence or 
nonexistence of other universes (perhaps with 
different constants). Until now there is no 
adequate theoretical or observational support 
for their existence, so it is only a thought-
experiment about some theoretical possibilities 
in connection with computing. 
On the other hand, Ken Wharton has sound 
arguments against the belief "that the universe 
must compute itself in the same manner" as a 
real computer [Wharton, 2012]. Agreeing with 
him, I am only to inquire into the theoretical 
possibilities of computing influenced by given 
physical parameters. 
Finally, we shall ignore today's silicon based 
computers' problems which are outcomes of 
actual technological problems. Their limitations 
determined by the laws of physics, but these laws 
define only the boundaries of the technological 
possibilities' phase space.  
We shall focus solely on theoretical questions and 
limits caused by some fundamental features of 
nature, as Shannon did it in his seminal treatise 
on information, which can be interpreted as an 
examination of theoretical limits of the amount 
of information transmitted via a noisy cannel 
[Shannon - Weaver, 1949]. 
Bennett and Landauer [1985] extended this kind 
of abstract approach writing about some 
fundamental physical limits of information 
processing, and hypercomputation makes a 
further step to theoretical "Platonist computers" 
which are incomparable to Turing computability. 
This presupposes in one form or other the 
existence of actual infinite in the physical world, 
and the Malament – Hogarth universes is an 
attempt to build a model based on some special 
features of a relativistic spacetime, where the 
difference between computable and 
uncomputable operations disappear [Barrow 
2007, 31 - 32].  
And there are other, at least imaginable solutions 
to exceed the limits determined by our physics in 
computation. 
 
Computing with different parameters 
or constants 
Seth Lloyd pointed out that the maximum 
computing capacity of a computer as a physical 
system is limited by the Planck constant (ħ); the 
speed of light (c); the Boltzmann constant (kB) 
and the gravitational constant G. Lloyd's 
"Ultimate Laptop" with one kg mass and one liter 
volume can perform 5.4258x1050 logical 
operations on about 1031 bits. Ad analogiam, 
knowing the mass of our Universe, we can 
calculate its maximum computing capacity [Lloyd, 
1999] and we can play with the idea of 
possibilities limited by different constants than 
ours'. 
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According to the supporters of the Anthropic 
Principle, life is strictly bounded to particular 
parameters of physical constants, and a small 
change can be fatal. The classic example is that a 
strong nuclear force 2% stronger would change 
the formation of helium, and this would 
presumably prevent the formation of stars as we 
know them. So Earthlike life would be impossible 
[Davies 1993, 70 - 71]. 
On the other hand, we can perform different 
amount of operations for a given unit of time in a 
universe where the parameters of the four above 
mentioned constants are different. A higher 
value for the speed of light results bigger 
computing capacity, a bigger gravitational 
constant causes a smaller one etc. (note that it is 
still not known whether the laws and constants 
are mutually independent of each other). 
Although we can change the parameters 
determining the efficiency of computing, several 
different "computable universes" possible (with 
higher or lower level speed of light etc.). The 
computation function is not sensitive to changes. 
Ed Fredkin examined the problem of "missing 
workload" in digital cosmology, namely, that the 
computational capacity of the space-time is in his 
model is mainly idle [Fredkin, no date]. Our 
problem is rather different, since our Universe 
seems to be not idle, but to be an inefficient 
computing mechanism. But universes with 
different types of constants can lead to both 
different and more efficient types of computing, 
although in other cases they would be less 
effective. 
We can catalogue them on the basis of their 
relations to the constants as it is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Possible types of computing  
type description 
C1 normal computing (in our Universe) 
C2 computing based on different 
parameters of our constants 
C3 computing based on different 
constants - in some cases it is 
impossible to interpret Lloyd's 
equations for them 
 
It have to be underlined that although the 
meaning of Universes with "different types of 
constants" is ill-defined, if defined at all, we can 
distinguish two different types of them. 
The first one is where some constants are 
missing, while other constants, which are present 
in our Universe, exist there. For example, without 
photons the meaning of speed of light is 
uninterpretable, and a further question whether 
the lack of speed of light as a boundary speed 
means that there is no boundary of speed at all, 
or a universe with boundary of speed based on 
other components. 
In the second type of universes, there are totally 
different forces and laws with totally different 
constants. 
 
Roughly-tuned for computing? 
As we have seen, life seems to be very sensitive 
even for small changes of certain parameters, but 
computer-friendliness is resistant to them. To top 
it all, changes in other constants' values doesn't 
have any influence on computer-friendliness.  
From Anthropic Principle's point of view, our 
Universe’s computing-friendliness is only a 
required condition. A universe without some 
causality and some kinds of conversation laws is 
not only uninterpretable as a computable system, 
but it wouldn't be able to produce living beings at 
all (this problem was explained, inter alia, by Max 
Tegmark [1997]). 
Opposing to this approach, it can be argued that 
our Universe is not fine-tuned for life, but 
roughly-tuned for computation, since this is its 
fundamental feature, and a universe which is 
unsuitable for life, can remain roughly-tuned for 
computing with a ranges of possible parameters 
and constants (although not with any of them). 
So since computing-friendliness seems to be 
much less depending on the concrete physical 
features of a universe than biofilness, this can be 
regarded as a more typical feature than life. On 
the contrary, biofilness is simply an 
epiphenomenon. 
 
Classification of possible Universes from 
computational point of view 
Tegmark introduced the idea of a "mathematical 
democracy" where "universes governed by other 
equations are equally real". Its phase space 
contains every possible mathematics [Tegmark, 
2005]. But according to Landauer, the platonic 
realm of mathematics and the real Universe are 
different, since the latter is limited by some 
physical restrictions. There are mathematical 
operations which due to the physical limitations, 
theoretically cannot be performed [Landauer, 
1986]. 
Landauer focused on the possibilities allowed by 
our physics, but as we have seen, we can ask 
questions about the physical limitations of other 
universes. In other words, we can describe 
universes regarding their computer-friendliness 
as shown in Table 2 (these categories not 
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necessarily overlaps our C1 - C3 classifications in 
Table 1). 
 
Table 2. Types of computational universes based 
on the speed of light 
type speed 
of light 
C1 C2 C3 
U1 
normal 
0 < c < 
∞ 
x x x 
U2 
hypercomputable 
c= ∞ --- x x 
U3 
zero 
c=0 --- x x 
 
Table 2 is based on the speed of light as an 
example. We can change other constants' 
parameters which are fundamental for 
computing, as well. What if G's numerical part is 
not 6.67384 × 10-11, and not 1 or 2 or any other, 
but either 0 or infinite? etc. 
U1 is a universe with ordinary constants, with 
either the same or different parameters - its 
computing can be either faster or slower than in 
our world, but it is essentially the same. 
U2 is a kind of a Universe which can perform even 
infinite calculation within a finite amount of time, 
since the speed of light is not a barrier, and thus, 
hypercomputing is a physical reality (notice that 
we don't make any distinction between 
countably and unaccountably infinite sequences, 
although this can lead to further questions).  
Regarding the transmission of information, the 
situation in a U2 world can be comparable with 
Newton's action at distance concept, where an 
object can affect another object without time, in 
a nonlocal way. 
U3 is a Universe without any possibility for 
computing: e.g. since c as a maximum speed is 
zero, there is no information transmission at all. 
 
Life, universe and computing 
At least one U1 universe is biofil, and the question 
about fine-tuning can be interpreted as a 
question whether the result of other 
combinations of our constants' parameters can 
result habitable environments. 
Anthropic Principle suggests that the answer is a 
clear “no”, but according to another opinion a 
ceteris paribus: changing only one parameter one 
time approach is misleading in this case. If you 
choose smaller tires to your car, they wouldn't fit 
on the wheels, but you can buy another car with 
different wheel size [Cohen - Stewart 2002, 5-7], 
and the situation is the same in connection with 
life's fine-tuning. So we have to make a 
distinction between fine-tuning and fragility (or 
probability of other forms of life fine-tuned to 
either different parameters or different 
constants), and following this logic, fine-tuning 
seems not to be a proof for uniqueness [ibid, 13]. 
This seems to be convincing, but to accept this 
metaphor, we have to accept that – similarly to 
different car brands – different types of life exist. 
But this is exactly the question, and nobody 
knows the answer. 
So the most we can say is that the possibility of 
other kinds of life which are fine-tuned to 
different constants, parameters, etc. cannot be 
ruled out, although it is plausible that there are 
more combinations of parameters of constants, 
which can lead to computable, than a biofil 
solution either in a U1 or in a U2 universe. 
On the other hand, if an ensemble of infinitely 
many universes exists, then there are equally 
infinitely many universes with biofil or lifeless 
parameters (i.e. U3 universes). Obviously it’s only 
a possibility which cannot be excluded actually, 
although neither the existence of a multiverse 
nor even the existence of a U3 universe is not 
proved. Ad absurdum, according to our actual 
knowledge (or ignorance), it is imaginable that 
either a U3 or a computable, but lifeless universe 
is theoretically impossible (although it seems to 
be improbable). 
This raises some questions. Leibniz assumed in 
the 17th century that there must be a reason for 
a thing's existence, so from his point of view it 
was a fundamental question why something 
existed instead of nothing [Holt 2013, 11]. 
The central problem of Anthropic Principle is why 
a biofil universe exists. Following this way of logic 
we can ask a similar question. 
We can argue that it is not surprising to observe 
a computable universe around us, because an 
uncomputable one is not suitable for life. But this 
is not an answer for the question that why exists 
a U1 universe instead of either a U2 or U3 
universe or instead of nothing. 
And a final question: What kind of other features 
can exist in our Universe in addition to bio- and 
computation-friendliness, which are worth to 
examine for fine-tuning? 
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